

Message Text

SECRET

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17-12
ACTION SS-30

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SUBJ: SEMENOV EXTEMPORANEOUS RESPONSE, NOVEMBER 2, 1973
(SALT TWO-337)

REF: SALT TWO GENEVA 5837

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION FROM REPORTING OFFICER AND
INTERPRETER NOTES OF EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT BY MINISTER
SEMENOV, FRIDAY NOVEMBER 2, 1973

SEMENOV'S EXTEMPORANEOUS RESPONSE TO JOHNSON STATEMENT
NOVEMBER 2, 1973

YOUR STATEMENT TODAY TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN
CONNECTION
WITH THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET UNION FOR CONSIDERATION
AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL, OF COURSE, BE STUDIED WITH ALL OF
THE DUE ATTENTION NECESSARY IN SUCH CASES.

IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR STATEMENT CORRECTLY, IN IT YOU EXPRESSED
THOSE CONSIDERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT WHICH
WE HAVE SPOKEN ALREADY, BOTH BETWEEN OURSELVES AS HEADS OF DELEGATION
AND IN THE COURSE OF OUR MEETINGS. THIS GIVES YOUR STATEMENT A CERTAIN

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SIGNIFICANCE; OF COURSE THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT BUT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT

SIGNIFICANCE DURING OUR STUDY OF IT. OF COURSE, IT SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE TO YOU OR TO YOUR COLLEAGUES IF I SAID THAT I CANNOT FULLY AGREE WITH THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WERE SET FORTH IN YOUR STATEMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME, THOUGH WE WILL HAVE TO STUDY YOUR STATEMENT IN DETAIL,

THAT THE ROOT OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US IS THAT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE

COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE NECESSITY TO CONSIDER THE WHOLE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS ENTIRETY AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE FACTORS INFLUENCING IT.

IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR APPROACHES TO THIS FOUNDATION ON WHICH THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO SIDES ARE BUILT, AND SINCE THE SOVIET DRAFT IS BASED ON THE SOVIET APPROACH, NATURALLY THERE ARE DIS-

CREPANCIES BETWEEN OUR ASSESSMENTS AND THE CONSLUSIONS WE DRAW CONCERNING ADHERENCE TO THAT PRINCIPLE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE OCTOBER 9 DRAFT AGREE-

MENT SUBMITTED ON INSTURCTIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT IS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTENDS IN THE NEAREST FUTURE TO EXPRESS ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RATIONALE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED. WE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING

OF THE BASIC NATURE OF THE DRAFT PROPOSAL. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ARE PERHAPS NOT OF SUCH MAJOR IMPORTANCE; BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT EVERY QUESTION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAS A CERTAIN SIGNIFICANCE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW THEY ARE ALSO QUITE IMPORTANT FOR

DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, I NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, AND THE US SIDE, TOO, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, PROCEED FROM RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THIS IS REALLY A VERY IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL FACT; IT ALSO INDICATES

THAT THE SIDES INTEND TO FOLLOW THE PATH AGREED UPON BETWEEN OUR HIGHEST

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LEADERS AT THE SUMMIT MEETINGS OF MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973. OF COURSE, I COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT IN YOUR STATEMENT TODAY YOU GAVE YOUR

INTERPRETATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES, AN INTERPRETATION WITH WHICH I CANNOT

AGREE. THOUGH I DO NOT THINK THESE QUESTIONS ARE SUCH THAT THEY CAN BE

IMMEDIATELY AGREED, INCLUDING THEIR SPECIFIC ASPECTS, THIS IS TRUE

EVEN OF
VERY SIMPLE QUESTIONS. WE ARE BOTH LOOKING AT THE SAME OBJECT; I SEE
IT FROM THIS SIDE, AND YOU SEE IT FROM THAT SIDE. OUR DESCRIPTION OF
THE OBJECT MAY NOT COINCIDE, AND MAY NOT CORRESPOND TO OBJECTIVE
REALITY
OR TO THE REAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECT. THEREFORE, THIS DOES NOT

UPSET ME, BUT NEITHER DOES IT BRING ME TO A STATE OF JOYOUS EXCITEMENT.

OF COURSE, IN PREPARING FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS WE TRIED, BECAUSE
WE FELT IT WAS DESIRABLE, TO SEE THE OTHER SIDE, THE SIDE YOU SEE, FOR

COMPLETENESS AND AN ALL-ROUND CONSIDERATION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

BUT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NEGOTIATIONS, THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE
KNOW HOW YOU SEE THE WHOLE SITUATION AND HOW YOU WOULD PROPOSE TO SOLVE

THE TASKS BEFORE US.

TODAY I DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH WORDS TO FULLY DESCRIBE THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE THINGS WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS KIND OF CONSTRUCTIVE CONDUCT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

WE ARE HEARING FROM YOU THAT THE SITUATION BEFORE THE JUNE 1973 SUMMIT

IS THE SAME AS THE SITUATION AFTER IT. THIS BOTHERS ME. AS YOU KNOW,
BY TRAINING, AND TO SOME DEGREE BY EXPERIENCE, I CONSIDER MYSELF SOME-

WHAT OF A PROFESSIONAL IN THE FIELD OF LOGIC, AND SUCH A TENET
DISTURBS ME.

IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE WANT TO ADDRESS CERTAIN ASPECTS WHICH
YOU TOUCHED ON TODAY, AND GIVE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS WHICH YOU
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PERHAPS HVE NOT HEARD AS YET; WE ALSO FEEL OBLIGED TO ANSWER THE
REMAINDER OF YOUR QUESTIONS.

IN CONCLUSION, IF YOU ARE NOT OPPOSED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT
WHAT YOU SAID TODAY IS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO
TRANSMIT THE COMPLETE TEXT TO MOSCOW FOR MORE COMPLETE STUDY BY OUR
AUTHORITIES. JOHNSON

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